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HEALTH CARE
MALPRACTICE SUITS:
THE INCREASED COST OF HEALTH CARE
Action by husband and wife charging the defendant sur-
geon with negligence in connection with the treatment of a
cancerous condition in the wife;" action by female plaintiff
charging the defendant surgeon with malpractice in carrying
out an operation to change the appearance of her anatomy;2
action by a twenty-four year old male to recover damages
which resulted when the defendant surgeon permitted an elec-
tric light bulb to pass through the plaintiff's throat and lodge
in his lung;3 action by father and son to recover damages sus-
tained when the defendant physician failed to adequately
care for the minor who was admitted to defendant's hospital
suffering from third degree burns covering eighteen percent
of his body;4 action by parents and infant for damages sus-
tained when the defendant physician used an unsterile instru-
ment to circumcise the two day old child;5 action for dam-
ages which resulted when the defendant surgeons broke off
and left an instrument in the plaintiff's body during surgery; 6
action by husband and wife to recover damages for injuries
to the wife which resulted when the defendant physician left
1 Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1955) (judgment for plaintiffs in the amount of
$79,000).
2 Gluckstein v. Lipsett, 93 Cal. App. 2d 391, 209 P.2d 98 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1949) (judgment for plaintiff in the amount of
$115,000).
a Rhodes v. Lamar, 145 Okla. 223, 292 P. 335 (1930) (judg-
ment for plaintiff in the amount of $8,000).
4 Carrasco v. Bankoff, 220 Cal. App. 2d 230, 33 Cal. Rptr. 673
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (judgment for plaintiffs in the amount
of $41,500).
Valentine v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 194 Cal. App. 2d
282, 15 Cal. Rptr. 26 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (judgment for
plaintiffs).
6 Taylor v. Milton, 353 Mich. 421, 92 N.W.2d 57 (1958) (judg-
ment for plaintiff in the amount of $2,500).
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a laparotomy sponge in the female's abdomen following a
caesarean operation;7 action against a physician for convul-
sive fractures sustained by a patient while undergoing insulin
therapy for the treatment of emotional illness;8 action by the
mother of a boy who died within twenty-four hours of an
accident, charging the defendant physician with malpractice
for failure to diagnose and treat an epidural hemorrhage;
action for damages due to plaintiff's loss of an eye following
surgery performed by the defendant physician;10 action for
damages sustained when the plaintiff's appendix was not re-
moved to its base.1
The preceding cases are representative of the causes of
action brought against physicians prior to 1970.12 A review
of these actions reveals three common characteristics. First,
in each action brought to tial a prima facie case of negligence
existed against the physician. Second, in each of the cases
the plaintiffs violated the long standing belief that the "phy-
sician knows best" and alleged that the proper degree of care
had not been exercised. Third, these allegations were gen-
erally made in the community where the physician had es-
tablished his practice of medicine.
7 Key v. Caldwell, 39 Cal. App. 2d 698, 104 P.2d 87 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1940) (judgment for plaintiffs).8 Mitchell v. Robinson, 360 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1962) (judgment
for the defendant).
9 Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951)
(judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence).
10 Scarano v. Schnoor, 158 Cal. App. 2d 612, 323 P.2d 178 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1958) (judgment for defendant).
H Iaggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 562 (1962)
(judgment for defendant).
12 See also Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964); Chris-
topher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965);
Kolesar v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1961);
Tyler v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969);
Corey v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 54, 454 P.2d 951 (1969); Denison
v. Goforth, 75 Wash. 2d 853, 454 P.2d 218 (1969); Sinz v.
Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).
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With the introduction of new techniques for the care and
cure of diseases, the '70's will see new types of actions being
litigated against the physician. Suit may be brought due to
a malfunction of a cardiac pacemaker, the failure of a renal
dialysis machine, the malfunction of a heart valve replace-
ment, the adverse effects of new drugs, the failure of an
artificial body organ, or even a faulty computer diagnosis.
In essence, while the allegations as to the cause of injury
may change, physicians will continue to be subject to mal-
practice actions in the future.
However, it would appear that the '70's should also see
a reduction in the litigation of claims with the first of the
three common characteristics. This reduction will occur, not
because sponges and instruments will no longer be closed
within surgical openings, but because the insurers of physi-
cians will settle more of these claims out of court. While the
insurers will continue to litigate the "unjustified" actions,
they will agree, with increasing frequency, to settlement of
the prima facie claims.
The second and third common characteristics will also
continue to exist into the '70's. No longer is the belief that the
"physician knows best" viable. Perhaps this can be attributed
to the fact that the concept of the family physician is no long-
er prevalent in our society. The heart specialist is a heart
specialist, not a family physician. Today we do not choose a
physician, we are referred to one depending on our afflic-
tion. During the '70's the relationship between the physician
and patient will continue to become less personal and more
business oriented. As a result, patients who are given improper
treatment will be even less hesitant about-bringing suit against
their physician.
The fact that malpractice suits have been brought and
will continue to be brought has had three adverse effects on
the practicing physician. First, the premiums the physician
1972]
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must pay for malpractice insurance have increased substan-
tially:
In New York the rates have increased 439 per-
cent in the last 5 years. This is during the period of
July 1, 1966 to July 1, 1971 ....
The average rates for all doctors in New York ef-
fective July 1, 1971, is $1,811 for limits of $500,000/
$1,500,000.
The highest rate for a doctor in New York who
has not been surcharged for poor experience is $6,797
for limits of $500,000/$1,500,000.
The highest rate charged a doctor whose rates
have been surcharged for bad experience is $23,000.13
The second, and most important, adverse effect is that
the fear of a malpractice suit may affect the method of prac-
tice adopted by the physician:
After a physician has had a suit brought against
him the threat of possible future suits hangs over him
like a cloud. It affects his daily life and never again
does he enjoy his work as much as beforehand and
probably does not do as good a job. He may tend to
avoid treatment problems simply because they carry
considerable risk and potential legal action.14
As stated by a prominent physician:
Physicians state that they must practice defensive
medicine because of the number of claims and that
they have discontinued performing certain procedures
because of their inherent risk. Physicians are practic-
ing defensive medicine and not good medicine. Until
some physicians feel that there will be some relief
from malpractice litigation they will continue to act
defensively. This attitude will not change.15
13 Linster, Insurance View of Malpractice, 38 INS. COUNSEL J.
528, 529 (1971).
14 Daughtry, The View of the Medical Profession, 38 Irs. CoUN-
SEL J. 534, 536 (1971).
15 Goldsmith, Medical Malpractice Trends, in LEG.AL MEDICINF
ANNUAL: 1971 at 451 (C. Wecht ed. 1971).
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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The third adverse effect is that a malpractice suit may
affect the physician's professional reputation in the communi-
ty where he practices. This is directly related to the second
effect and may cause him to lose patients either directly or
through referrals from other physicians.
The effect of malpractice suits has also been felt by the
consumer or patient in two major areas. First, the cost of
health care has substantially increased. Through January, 1972,
using the health care components of the Consumer Price In-
dex, the Daily Hospital Service Charge has increased 67.1%
since 1967 and the Physician's Fee has increased 32.3%.16 Sec-
ond, the consumer will not receive either the best, or the most
economical, treatment available if his physician is practicing
defensive medicine.
Malpractice suits have and will continue to have effects
on both the physician and the consumer. Higher malpractice
insurance premiums have a direct inflationary effect on the
cost of health care. This cost is increased even more by the
practice of defensive medicine. The use of extra diagnostic
tests, the opinion of one or more consultants, and other de-
fensive practices may safeguard the interest of the physician,
but they must also be paid for by the patient. While some
of these extra tests and consultations may result in better
treatment, most will not be reasonable or necessary for the
actual needs of the patient. Since physicians, like all business-
men, pass their costs on to the public, the consumers will,
in the long run, absorb the entire cost of the malpractice
phenomenon.
The question that must be considered is whether or not
the consumer should bear the increase in the cost of health
care which is attributable to the practice of defensive medi-
cine.
16 Information furnished by the Research Department, Group
Hospital Service, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
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On July 30, 1965, Congress enacted Public Law 89-97,
"Health Insurance for the Aged Act."' 7 The purpose of this
legislation was to:
[P]rovide a coordinated approach for health in-
surance and medical care for the aged under the So-
cial Security Act by establishing three new health
care programs: (1) a compulsory hospital-based pro-
gram for the aged; (2) a voluntary supplementary
plan to provide physicians' and other supplementary
health services for the aged; and (3) an expanded
medical assistance program for the needy and medi-
cally needy aged, blind, disabled, and families with
dependent children. 8
Congress defined the hospital 9 and physician" services
which were to be covered and excluded those items which
were not to be covered with explicit statutory language.2 1
Germane to this discussion is t h e following exclusionary
language used by Congress:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this
title, no payment may be made under Part A or Part
B for any expenses incurred for items or services -
(1) which are not reasonable and necessary for
the diagnosis treatment of illness or injury or to im-
prove the functioning of a malformed body member.2
The purpose of this language was stated by Congress in terms
of examples:
[P]ayment could be made for the rental of a special
hospital bed to be used by a patient in his home only
if it was reasonable and necessary part of a sick per-
sons treatment. Similarly, such potential personal
comfort items and services as massages and heat lamp
treatments would only be covered where they contri-
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395kk (1070).
18 1965-1 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 1943.
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395d, 1395x(b) (1970).
20 42 U.S.C. § 1395k (1970).
21 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (1970).
22 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (a) (1) (1970) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 8, No. 2
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 8 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss2/5
HEALTH CARE
bute meaningfully to the treatment of an illness or
injury or the functioning of a malformed body mem-
ber. Expenses for custodial care would also be ex-
cluded.2
If "reasonable" is defined as "fit and appropriate to the end
in view" 24 and "necessary" as "something which in the accom-
plishment of a given object cannot be dispensed with",25 then
the following conclusion may be reached: Congress, in fund-
ing Public Law 89-97, did not intend to provide benefits for
services which were not appropriate for the alleviation of
an adverse condition afflicting a patient. In other words, the
inference that must be drawn from this exclusionary language
is that Congress did not intend to absorb the additional cost
of health care which is attributable to increased malpractice
insurance premiums and the practice of defensive medicine.
Congress provided for the use of public agencies or pri-
vate organizations to facilitate payments to the providers of
health services under both "Part A-Hospital Insurance Bene-
fits for the Aged" 26 and "Part B-Supplementary Medical In-
surance Benefits for the Aged."2 7 One of the functions of these
agencies or intermediaries is to provide the appropriate bene-
fits on each claim in light of the congressional intent mani-
fested in the statute. Consequently, an intermediary may re-
fuse to make payment on a claim on the grounds that the
services provided were not reasonable and necessary.
If the intermediary denies benefits to the insured, the
insured has a statutory right to a hearing to determine the
validity of this decision.28 To date, there has been no judicial
review of these hearings due to the fact that the hearing
examiners have consistently decided in favor of the insured.
1965-1 U.S. CoDE Co NG. & AD. NEws 1989.
24 BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 1431 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
25 Id. at 1181.
26 42 U.S.C. § 1395h (1970).
27 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (1970).
28 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (1970).
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The following excerpt from a hearing examiner's opinion is
an example of the logic currently used in these decisions:
[Claimant [77 years of age] was admitted
to the hospital on May 25, 1970, and remained there
as a patient through June 28, 1970 .... [Tihe hos-
pital insurance program paid for services from May
25 through May 31, 1970, and denied payment there-
after.
The medical evidence of record herein establish-
es that the physician's orders, with reference to the
care of the claimant after May 31, 1970, consisted of
a regular diet, laboratory and diagnostic studies and
oral medications of aspirin, cafergot, milk of mag-
nesia, feorinal, dramimine, oxaine, and elixin terpin
hydrate .... [O]ther orders were for intramuscular
injections of sodium luminal, whenever necessary,
and enemas when needed.
[I]t is . . . difficult for this hearing examiner
to reconcile himself to the fact that, when one places
themselves under the care of a physician in a hospital,
how are they to know when it is no longer necessary
for them to remain in the hospital, other than by re-
liance upon their attending physician to discharge
them from the hospital.
The medical evidence of record establishes that
the claimant herein was 77 years of age at the time
she was admitted to the hospital ... that she had no
way of knowing what was necessary hospital treat-
ment and what w a s unnecessary hospital treat-
ment . ...
Accordingly, it is the decision of t h e hearing
examiner that the claimant is entitled to hospital
insurance benefits for the period from May 25 through
June 28, 1970, under the provisions of the Social Se-
curity Act, as amended.29
29 Hearing conducted by the Social Security Administration,
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, February 11, 1972, Mus-
kogee, Oklahoma.
(Vol. 8, No. 2
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The stated purpose of Public Law 89-97 is to provide bene-
fits for reasonable and necessary medical care for the aged.
However, the hearing examiner, in the foregoing example,
allowed a recovery of hospital insurance benefits even though,
by his own language, he indicated that the services provided
were neither reasonable nor necessary for the proper treat-
ment of the claimant. The logical basis for this decision is
that the patient or consumer is not the proper party to be
responsible for knowing what is and what is not reasonable
and necessary health care.
This decision, and the logic which underlies it, has three
major and unfortunate consequences. First, by allowing the
claimant to recover, congressional intent has been thwarted.
Second, by providing full benefits to the claimant, the hear-
ing examiner has sanctioned the practice of defensive medi-
cine. Third, by allowing a full recovery, the hearing examiner
has forced the Social Security Administration, and in turn
the American public, to absorb the costs which flow from the
malpractice phenomenon. In reality, this decision, while bene-
ficial to the claimant, is detrimental to the remainder of the
consuming public.
There can be no argument with the hearing examiner's
decision that the patient should not be responsible for know-
ing what is and what is not reasonable and necessary serv-
ices. However, to escape the consequences outlined above and
to effectuate the intent of Congress, the burden of responsi-
bility must be placed somewhere. The question, thus, becomes
whether the attending physician or the hospital administra-
tion should be responsible for making this determination. In
enacting Public Law 89-97 Congress answered this question
with the following provision:
(k) A utilization review plan of a hospital or ex-
tended care facility shall be considered sufficient if
it is applicable to services furnished by the institution
to individuals entitled to insurance benefits under this
subchapter and if it provides-
(1) for the review, on a sample or other basis, of
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admissions to the institutions, the duration of stays
therein, and the professional services (including drugs
and biologicals) furnished, (A) with respect to the
medical necessity of the services, and (B) for the pur-
poses of promoting the most efficient use of avail-
able health facilities and services .... 30
This provision indicates that Congress intended to place the
burden of responsibility on the hospital administration. Thus,
the medical necessity and reasonableness of care rendered
by a physician in a hospital should be determined by hos-
pital based utilization review committees.
Since Congress has placed the burden of responsibility
on the hospital, the controversy over the reasonableness and
necessity of health care services provided to a patient should
be between the intermediary and the hospital, and not be-
tween the insurer and the claimant. And, if at an administra-
tive hearing it is determined that the care provided was not
reasonable and necessary, then the hospital should absorb the
expenses incurred by the patient which were not covered by
health insurance.
The majority of the population of this country is not en-
titled to the health insurance benefits provided by Public
Law 89-97. Consequently, an individual who desires health
insurance protection must obtain it either on a group basis
at his place of employment or on an individual basis. While
the scope of benefits differ, most of the private health insur-
ance programs available today are drawn in language similar
to Public Law 89-97.31 These private, as opposed to govern-
mental, insurers have also expressed the intent that they will
80 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (k) (1970) (emphasis added).
31 The "Group Membership Agreement", Group Hospital Serv-
ice, Tulsa, Oklahoma, provides as follows:
ARTICLE V. EXCLUSIONS
(3) Hospital Care and Services principally for
diagnosis, diagnostic study, or medical observation
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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not provide benefits for unreasonable and unnecessary serv-
ices provided to the insured.
As a hypothetical example, assume that an individual
covered through private health insurance is put in an Okla-
homa hospital by his physician on May 25 and is discharged
on June 28. Assume also that his insurer has denied benefits
for the services provided after May 31 on the grounds that
they were not reasonable and necessary. Based on an aver-
age charge per day for Oklahoma hospitals during 1971 of
$89.93,32 an additional $2,607.97 would have to paid to the
hospital. If a subsequent determination is made that the serv-
ices rendered were not reasonable and necessary, then con-
sideration must, again, be given to the question of whether
the patient, the attending physician or the hospital should
absorb the additional amount.
(even though therapy directed toward the relief
of symptoms may be rendered) when the necessary
Care and Services could properly be provided on
an Out-Patient basis and the condition of the Sub-
scriber or the nature of the procedure does not
necessitate that the Subscriber be hospitalized as
an In-Patient; or for convalescent or rest cures,
or custodial care . ...
The "Group M a j o r Medical Membership Agreement",
Group Hospital Service, Tulsa, Oklahoma, provides as fol-
lows:
ARTICLE 1- DEFINITIONS
(1) COVERED MEDICAL EXPENSES: The
term "Covered Medical Expenses" shall mean cus-
tomary, reasonable, and necessary charges in the
community where the service is incurred . ...
32 Information supplied by the Research Department, Group
Hospital Service, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
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Since Oklahoma has a statute 3 which implies that every
licensed hospital in the state may make use of a utilization
review procedure, the argument made with respect to Public
Law 89-97 may be restated. The primary controversy should
lie between the hospital and the private insurer, with the
hospital absorbing those expenses incurred by the patient
which are determined to be not properly covered by the
health insurance.
There can be no doubt that malpractice suits have had
an adverse effect on both the cost of health care and the quali-
ty of health service available to the consuming public. There
appears to be no immediate solution to this problem. How-
ever, as the patient or consumer is least able to judge the
reasonableness and necessity of the treatment he receives, he
should not have to bear the increase in the cost of health care
which is attributable to the malpractice phenomenon.
Today our legislatures are inquiring into the problems
inherent in automobile liability insurance, perhaps this is the
appropriate time to consider the similar problems that exist
in the health care field.
Stephen L. Andrew
33 OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1709 (1971), which states in part:
Physicians and others appointed to hospital utiliza-
tion review committees for the purpose of deter-
mining the optimum use of hospital services shall
be immune from liability with respect to decisions
made as to such utilization and actions thereunder
so long as such physicians or others act in good
faith ....
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